A pressure group is an organised group of people united in the promotion of a common cause or interest. They are so-called because of their role in applying “pressure” on government, public opinion and other institutions to advance their political and/or policy objectives.
Unlike political parties, pressure groups do not typically seek to win political office themselves. Instead, they aim to influence those who hold power. They are a vital, though sometimes controversial, feature of the UK’s democratic process.
Types of pressure group
There is a pressure group fighting for every interest, demographic and idea imaginable in British politics. They are incredibly diverse, ranging from large trade unions and business federations to local community campaigns and charities.
Pressure groups can be categorised based on their relationship with the government.
Insider groups
Insider groups are those that have regular, privileged, and direct access to government decision-makers. They are often consulted by government departments when new policy is being developed due to their expertise and standing. Examples include the National Farmers’ Union (NFU), the British Medical Association (BMA), and major business groups like the Confederation of British Industry (CBI).
Outsider groups
Outsider groups do not have the same level of access to government and seek to exert influence from the outside. They typically rely on media campaigns, public protests, and direct action to promote their cause. Examples include environmental groups like Greenpeace and Just Stop Oil.
This insider-outsider distinction, however, is not fixed. A group’s status can change depending on the government of the day. For example, trade unions will have greater ‘insider’ access under a Labour government, while business groups may have more influence under a Conservative administration.
Evaluation question
To what extent does this framework bias the democratic process in favour of wealthy, corporate interests over grassroots citizen campaigns?
The role of pressure groups in democracy: the case for and against
The case for
Proponents of a pluralist democracy argue that pressure groups are essential for a healthy political system.
They provide “functional representation”, representing specific sections of society and specialist interests that might otherwise be overlooked in a system focused on geographic constituencies.
They can improve policy by providing decision-makers and stakeholders with valuable expertise, data and evidence. They can run public information campaigns, ensuring an educated electorate while providing a perspective that could clash with the government’s position, which might otherwise be predominant.
They are also a means of promoting participation, providing a channel for interested citizens to engage with the political process on issues they care about, particularly between elections.
Crucially, pressure groups can hold the government to account with their activism. They can publicise different aspects of government policy and give a voice to minority interests, thereby preventing a potential “tyranny of the majority” when it comes to policy-making.
The case against
A well-funded pressure group representing a minority section of society can exert a disproportionate influence on policy, leading to a “tyranny of the minority” where narrow interests override the general public good. The position of a powerful pressure group could conflict with the general will of the population as a whole.
Evaluation question
To what extent does the success of concentrated, single-issue campaigns like Keep Sunday Special in inflicting parliamentary defeats represent a triumph of pluralist democracy, as opposed to a “tyranny of the minority”?
In this way, pressure groups are self-appointed and unaccountable to the public, yet they seek to influence the democratically elected government.
For these reasons, the former foreign secretary and home secretary, Douglas Hurd, once described pressure groups as “serpents that strangle efficient government”. The influential Keep Sunday Special campaign helped inflict a defeat on the Thatcher government during Hurd’s tenure as a minister (see below).
There is also a significant inequality between groups, problematising any suggestion of perfectly pluralistic participation. Well-funded corporate lobbies often have far greater resources and access than grassroots campaigns or charities.
Pressure group tactics
Pressure groups use a wide range of tactics to achieve their goals.
Direct lobbying
This involves direct contact with decision-makers, including meetings with government ministers, civil servants and MPs to make their case in private.
Public campaigning
This aims to influence public opinion and thereby place indirect pressure on the government. Tactics include media campaigns, advertising and producing research reports. The rise of social media has provided further means for pressure groups to promote their interests.
Grassroots mobilisation
Many groups mobilise their own members and the wider public. This can involve encouraging supporters to write to their local MP or to sign petitions. The official e-petitions website on the UK Parliament’s website is a key tool for modern campaigns.
Legal action
An increasingly common tactic is the use of legal challenges. Pressure groups may seek a judicial review in the courts to challenge the lawfulness of a government decision or policy.
Direct action
This is typically used by outsider groups and can range from peaceful marches and demonstrations to acts of civil disobedience, such as roadblocks or protests designed to cause disruption and attract media attention.
Pressure group case study: the Gurkha Justice Campaign
The Gurkha Justice Campaign was a prominent pressure group that secured a notable change in policy from the government of the day, led by Gordon Brown as prime minister.
The campaign sought to end a policy that denied automatic settlement rights to Gurkhas who had retired before July 1997, when the Gurkha Brigade headquarters moved from Hong Kong to the UK. (Before October 2004, Gurkhas were not allowed to settle in the UK).
Campaigners, most notably the actress and model Joanna Lumley, argued that the rules were unjust and dishonoured the soldiers’ service. Lumley’s father served for 30 years with the 6th Gurkha Rifles.
Lumley, the lead organiser and public face of the Gurkha Justice Campaign, was born in Kashmir and spent her early life in Hong Kong and Malaysia.
In September 2008, the high court ruled that immigration rules denying Gurkhas who retired before 1997 an automatic right to stay in the UK were unlawful. A November 2008 petition, calling on the government to allow all retired Gurkhas the right to settle, was signed by 250,000 people and delivered to Downing Street.
On 20 November 2008, Lumley led a group of Gurkhas, campaigners and cross-party MPs from Parliament Square to 10 Downing Street, where they delivered the petition.
An all-party parliamentary group (APPG) on Gurkhas’ rights was also constituted, led by Labour MP Martin Salter. The APPG went on to spearhead the revolt of Labour MPs during the opposition day debate, with Salter one of several who abstained.
In April 2009, Brown’s government unveiled new settlement rules in response to the high court ruling. Campaigners argued that they were still too restrictive; they set criteria based on residence in the UK, length of service, connection to family in the UK, medals received, and medical conditions aggravated by service. Gurkhas wanting to settle in the UK had to meet one or more of these requirements.
The Home Office maintained that rules would allow about 4,300 more to settle, but the Gurkha Justice Campaign claimed it would be just 100.
On 29 April 2009, Brown’s government suffered a rare defeat in the House of Commons over the issue. MPs voted by 267 to 246 in favour of a Liberal Democrat motion to grant all Gurkhas an equal right of residence, a majority of 21.
The result, which saw 27 Labour MPs rebel against their own government, was a major victory for the high-profile Gurkha Justice Campaign. Keith Vaz, Diane Abbott, Glenda Jackson and Jeremy Corbyn were among the Labour MPs who voted for the motion. There were also a significant number of abstentions among Labour MPs – which was crucial to determining the outcome of the vote. The government had a majority of 63 at the time, suggesting there were as many as 70 abstentions.
The successful opposition motion, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, called for these proposals to be withdrawn and “an equal right of residence for all Gurkhas”.
The commons vote was not binding, as is the nature of opposition day motions, but the defeat marked an embarrassing political blow to the government and Brown’s authority. The immigration minister, Phil Woolas, subsequently announced that the government would accept the “will of the House” and review its policy.
Three weeks later, on 21 May, home secretary Jacqui Smith announced a policy reversal, granting all Gurkhas who had served more than four years the right to settle in the UK.
The outcome was seen as a testament to the power of a well-organised public campaign and cross-party pressure. Responding to the announcement, Lumley said: “A great injustice has been righted. The Gurkhas are coming home… It is a day of such exhilaration. I can hardly believe it.”
Pressure group case study: The Stop the War Coalition
The Stop the War Coalition was founded on 21 September 2001 in the weeks following 9/11, when the US president, George W. Bush, announced the “war on terror”. It grew into a broad alliance of anti-war organisations to campaign against the impending war in Afghanistan. It was initially chaired by Lindsey German, then active in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). Sponsors of the coalition included Labour Party figures such as Tony Benn, George Galloway, Tam Dalyell and Jeremy Corbyn.
The coalition’s single, overriding objective in late 2002 and early 2003 was to prevent the government, led by Tony Blair as prime minister, from committing UK forces to a US-led invasion of Iraq.
On 15 February 2003, in what is believed to be the largest political demonstration in British history, over one million people marched through central London to protest against the prospect of war. The event, organised by the Stop the War Coalition, was part of a coordinated global day of action that reportedly saw over 20 million demonstrate in cities worldwide.
By the time of the February 2003 march, the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party (SNP) had all affiliated to the Stop the War Coalition.
Protesters marched from two points, the Embankment and Gower Street, before converging on a rally in Hyde Park. A wide range of speakers addressed the crowd. The veteran anti-war campaigner and former Labour minister Tony Benn drew huge applause.
Benn told the crowd: “We are here today to found a new political movement worldwide – the biggest demonstration ever in Britain.
“The first global demonstration. And its first cause is to prevent a war against Iraq. It must also be about other matters as well. It must be about the establishment of a Palestinian state.”
Other speakers included Liberal Democrat leader Charles Kennedy, mayor of London Ken Livingstone, Labour MPs Corbyn and Galloway, former cabinet minister Mo Mowlam, actor Tim Robbins, playwright Harold Pinter, human rights campaigner Bianca Jagger, and the American civil rights leader and former presidential candidate, the Rev Jesse Jackson.
Kennedy, in his contribution, pointed to “misleading” and “inconclusive” evidence provided by the government.
The Liberal Democrat leader said he had been asking questions related to a possible war in Iraq for months, receiving only “confusing, alarming” answers from the prime minister.
He added: “So I have joined you here today and I have been asking these questions for months in Parliament because I am not persuaded by the case for war. The arguments have been contradictory and inconsistent and the information has all too often been misleading as well as inconclusive.”
Jesse Jackson led the crowd in chanting “give peace a chance, keep hope alive”.
The demonstration came as Blair warned of the “bloody consequences” if Iraq was not confronted.
In a speech, the prime minister said: “I ask the marchers to understand this: I do not seek unpopularity as a badge of honour… But sometimes it is the price of leadership and the cost of conviction.”
The Stop the War Coalition march did not achieve its aim of preventing military action.
On 25 February, the US and the UK submitted a draft resolution to the UN arguing that Iraq had missed its “final opportunity” to disarm peacefully. France, Germany and Russia submitted a rival proposal to the council calling for further weapons inspections as an alternative to military action. In March, France announced it would join Russia in vetoing a proposed UN resolution which gave Iraq until 17 March to disarm.
Britain, the United States and Spain, having all promoted the proposed resolution, later abandoned it in the face of opposition. George Bush responded by giving Iraq leader Saddam Hussein and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq or face war.
The House of Commons voted in favour of war the following month, and the invasion of Iraq began on 20 March 2003 – just 33 days after the Stop the War Coalition demonstration.
Evaluation question
How far does the failure of the 2003 Stop the War protest to prevent Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq demonstrate the limitations of mass outsider campaigning when confronted by a determined executive with a large parliamentary majority?
Pressure group case study: the Keep Sunday Special campaign
The Keep Sunday Special campaign is a powerful if somewhat unlikely coalition of religious groups, social conservatives, some prominent food retailers, smaller private businesses and trade unionists, which opposes plans to introduce Sunday trading in England and Wales.
In April 1986, one year after its founding, the campaign helped inflict a rare defeat on Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government. The Shops Bill, which aimed to do away with all government regulation of Sunday shopping in England and Wales, was defeated by 296 votes to 282 – a majority of 14 – at second reading. At the time, the government boasted a towering parliamentary majority of 140.
The defeat over the Shops Bill was delivered by a rebellion of 72 Conservative MPs, who defied a three-line whip and voted with the opposition. Conservative opponents of the legislation included those who sought to preserve the sanctity of the Christian Sabbath.
Meanwhile, Labour MPs, who also voted against the bill en masse, were largely motivated by the concerns voiced by trade unions and fears over eroding shop workers’ rights. Critical MPs also voiced concerns about the impact of deregulation on small, independent retailers.
During its commons second reading debate, a number of MPs referred to the concerted lobbying on the issue of Sunday trading and the “weight of mail in their postbags.”
In total, a reported 32,543 letters were sent to Downing Street on the subject.
During the debate, Douglas Hurd, the home secretary, told MPs: “Many of us see no contradiction between believing that the Shops Act 1950 is unworkable and should go and wanting to keep Sunday special. We see no difficulty or contradiction in belonging to both bodies of opinion…
“The question is not whether Sunday should be kept special but what precisely should be the role of the law in that regard.”
Labour MP Donald Anderson, a patron of the Keep Sunday Special campaign, told the House: “The market forces which will be generated will ensure that, by and large, through this irreversible and inevitable process, Sunday will be just like any other shopping day. Our people do not want that.
“They recognise the effect on shop workers and their families. On any analysis, there will be greater pressures on family life as a result of the measure. Many Conservative Members realise that the disintegration of family life today is a major cause of the increase in crime.”
Conservative MP Sir Bernard Braine, another patron of the Keep Sunday Special campaign, said: “Basically, the bill is about market shares. It is not about freedom, as some claim, as there is no clamour from the constituencies for it. It is about destroying Sunday as a day set apart for centuries as one of rest, relaxation, recreation and family togetherness…
“We who are privileged to sit here have a responsibility to preserve the best of the traditions handed down to us from our predecessors and to cherish them for future generations. We are never more than trustees for posterity. Once the special character of Sunday has been destroyed, it cannot be recreated.”
The Shops Bill saga was a demonstration of the limits of Thatcher’s authority. Crucially, it encapsulated the ideological-moral tensions between her liberal economic policy which championed deregulation, and the standing of some more socially conservative Tory MPs.
The Shops Bill saga marked the only major parliamentary defeat Thatcher suffered during her time in office. Following the defeat, the government was forced to abandon its plans, and the issue of Sunday trading was not treated again until a compromise measure allowing limited opening hours, set out in the Sunday Trading Act 1994, was passed.
Under the 1994 act, large shops are allowed to open for up to six hours on Sundays between 10:00 am and 6:00 pm. During the act’s passage, the Keep Sunday Special campaign said the measures would lead to an “erosion of family life”.
Pressure group case study: Fathers 4 Justice
Founded in 2003, Fathers 4 Justice (or F4J) is a fathers’ rights campaign group. Historically, it has pursued its objectives through a highly visible and often controversial direct-action approach.
On 19 May 2004, two F4J activists hurled projectiles filled with purple flour at the prime minister, Tony Blair, during a session of prime minister’s questions. The projectiles landed on the government frontbench, striking Blair on his back and shoulder and narrowly missing other cabinet ministers.
The speaker of the House of Commons, Michael Martin, suspended the sitting and the chamber was cleared while an investigation began. It was found that the two men, aged 50 and 36, had gained access to the gallery after securing tickets from a Labour peer, Baroness Golding. It was reported that they had secured the tickets at a charity auction. In a statement, Golding offered her “unreserved apologies” to the speaker and MPs.
The F4J activists were subsequently charged with public order offences and fined £500 and £600 respectively.
In an article published 20 May 2004, the Times argued that Fathers 4 Justice had become “the most prominent guerrilla pressure group in Britain”.
The group continued to organise headline-grabbing stunts. In September 2004, a F4J activist climbed the walls of Buckingham Palace dressed as Batman.
Then in June 2008, two F4J activists climbed onto the roof of Labour Party deputy leader Harriet Harman’s house while wearing superhero costumes.
The group was disbanded in 2006 following reports linking the group to a plan to kidnap Tony Blair’s son, Leo, who was five years old.
Evaluation question
Can highly disruptive stunts advance a pressure group’s policy goals without alienating the decision-makers and public they are trying to influence?
But a stunt on the BBC’s National Lottery Show in May 2006 suggested the group had re-emerged. Six F4J protesters ran onto the stage displaying posters that read: “Family Law Lotto, Next Time It Could Be You!”
The first modern pressure group? The Anti-Corn Law League (ACLL)
On 20 March 1839, the Anti-Corn Law League (ACLL) was formally established to agitate for the repeal of taxes levied on imported grain. The organisation would become one of the most formidable pressure groups in British political history.
The ACLL’s sole objective was the complete repeal of the Corn Laws, a series of tariffs designed to favour domestic agriculture. These laws safeguarded the interests of Britain’s traditional country landowners by keeping the price of bread artificially high. First introduced in 1815, the laws pitted the landowning aristocracy, which was well-represented in parliament, against the industrial classes – growing in size and political consciousness.
Led by Richard Cobden and John Bright, the ACLL built a powerful coalition of middle-class manufacturers, who argued the laws were morally and economically injurious. Cobden, the movement’s chief strategist, and Bright, its most effective orator, both won election to parliament in the early 1840s – on anti-Corn Law, anti-protectionism platforms.
For Cobden and Bright, their anti-Corn Law position provided the spearhead of a more far-reaching liberal worldview. But the ACLL maintained a single policy throughout its existence – which aided the campaign’s appeal and accessibility. Moreover, the ACLL is recognised for pioneering new methods of political agitation. It adopted tactics such as mass rallies addressed by professional speakers, fundraising activities, membership drives, voter registration, and a sophisticated propaganda operation of pamphlets and lectures to mobilise public opinion.
The body’s founding meeting resolved upon “the formation of a permanent union, to be called the Anti-Corn-Law League” and the establishment of a central office in Manchester. The new group was entrusted to engage and recommend “competent lecturers”, secure positive press coverage, and establish “a stamped circular, for the purpose of keeping a constant correspondence with the local associations.”
From April 1839, the ACLL began publishing the Anti Corn Law Circular. In a few weeks it had a circulation of 15,000. The publication was soon succeeded by the Anti-Bread-Tax Circular (1841-1843); having become a weekly in December 1842, the circular was itself replaced by a new title: The League.
In 1843, The Economist was founded by James Wilson to further the cause of free trade with assistance from the ACLL.
Between 1839 and 1843, the League was the most persistent petitioner of the House of Commons. Across this period, there were 16,351 petitions for repeal tabled in the House – an average of 3270 per session, with an average total signatures of 1,153,690 every session. And by 1845, the league boasted 225 affiliated associations.
Sir Robert Peel, the Conservative prime minister, converted to the policy of Cobden and the ACLL in 1846 – spurred by the failure of the Irish potato crop in 1845 and the famine that followed.
In February 1846, with the prime minister preparing to bring in a repeal bill, Cobden privately acknowledged the toll of the long campaign. Writing to Bright, Cobden confessed that he was “anxious to put an end honourably to the agitation – I have taxed beyond my powers in every way.”
In his resignation speech, Peel credited Cobden for the repeal of the Corn Laws.
The policy split the governing Conservative Party and precipitated Peel’s resignation as prime minister. Those Conservatives who remained loyal to Peel, known as the pro-free trade Peelites, included future prime ministers the Earl of Aberdeen and Gladstone. In June 1859, meeting at Willis’ Rooms, St James’s Street, the Peelites united with the Whigs and the Radicals to form the Liberal Party.
Free-trade liberalism ultimately found its fullest political expression in the Gladstonian Liberal Party.
The ACLL’s campaign, therefore, marked a significant step towards a new era of free trade.
Additional resources
- Register of Consultant Lobbyists: https://registrarofconsultantlobbyists.org.uk
- Transparency International UK: https://www.transparency.org.uk/