James “Jim” Callaghan served as the prime minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from April 1976 to May 1979.

Callaghan was sometimes referred to as “Sailor Jim”, on account of his service in the Second World War, and “Sunny Jim” for his upbeat temperament. He was appointed prime minister after the shock resignation of Harold Wilson in 1976 and led the Labour Party into the 1979 general election. After his 1979 defeat and Margaret Thatcher’s appointment as prime minister, Callaghan resigned as leader of the Labour Party.

Callaghan is the only person to have occupied all four “great offices of state”, having served as chancellor of the exchequer (1964-1967), home secretary (1967-1970), foreign secretary (1974-1976) and prime minister.

Callaghan stood down as an MP at the 1987 general election and was elevated to the House of Lords shortly thereafter. He first entered parliament as part of Labour’s 1945 post-war landslide.

Britain’s longest-lived prime minister, Callaghan died on the eve of his 93rd birthday on 26 March 2005.

Leadership victory and the Lib-Lab pact (1976–77)

Callaghan was appointed prime minister on 5 April 1976 after winning the second and final ballot of the Labour Party leadership contest. The 64-year-old foreign secretary defeated the candidate of the party’s left, employment secretary Michael Foot, by 176 votes to 137 following a swift two-week contest.

Upon his appointment, Callaghan reportedly exclaimed: “Prime minister, and I never went to university!”.

The 1976 Labour leadership election was triggered by Harold Wilson’s shock resignation three weeks earlier. Callaghan, however, is said to have been tipped off as to Wilson’s intentions some days in advance. The foreign secretary, considered a non-divisive and experienced candidate, entered the contest as the favourite.

The 1976 Labour leadership contest is remembered today for its display of considerable political talent. The roster of candidates – Callaghan, Foot, Roy Jenkins, Tony Benn, Denis Healey and Anthony Crossland – were all heavyweight figures in their own right. In his acceptance speech, Callaghan paid tribute to Wilson, but asked for the party to “wipe the slate clean”. He took on Labour’s factions, declaring: “If we work together as a team, we shall be unbeatable. I want no cliques. There will be no insiders and no outsiders.”

In his first televised address to the nation, Callaghan acknowledged the difficulties ahead. “There is no soft option. I don’t promise you any real easement for some time to come”, he said. Callaghan further vowed to govern with “determination, energy and optimism” in his first appearance at the despatch box as prime minister on 6 April 1976.

Callaghan inherited a precarious political and economic situation.

Britain was in the grip of an economic crisis with high inflation. In the end, Callaghan’s tenure as prime minister was defined by the struggle against these economic headwinds, leading to the 1976 sterling crisis. Callaghan’s decision to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an emergency loan in 1976 created significant tensions within the Labour Party and cabinet.

Labour, meanwhile, stood on the cusp of losing its majority in parliament.

In 1976, the Labour government’s slim parliamentary majority was gradually eroded by a run of by-election losses. Callaghan initially sought to remain in office through an agreement known as the “Lib-Lab Pact”.

A joint statement announcing the Lib-Lab pact was issued on 23 March 1977. It confirmed the creation of a joint consultative committee, established under the leader of the House, Michael Foot, to examine policy before it reached the floor of the House. Under the terms of the pact, Callaghan pledged to progress legislation for Scottish and Welsh devolution – a key Liberal demand. The government also committed to subject forthcoming legislation concerning elections to the European parliament to a free vote. The European Assembly Elections Bill included a procedural device that allowed the proposed first past the post (FPTP) system and proposed proportional representation system to be set out in the same bill. This would leave the choice of determining the electoral system to a free vote of MPs during the bill’s committee stage. An anti-PR amendment was ultimately approved by 319 votes to 222.

The pact ended in the summer of 1978, after 15 months, depriving the government of 13 crucial parliamentary votes. Labour was left to rely on ad-hoc support and an often innovative whipping operation.

Election speculation and the Winter of Discontent (1978-1979)

At around this time, however, with the economic picture now improving, Labour edged ahead of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party in the opinion polls. Inflation, which had peaked at 26% in 1975, fell into the single digits in 1978. Unemployment declined from a peak of 1.5 million in the third quarter of 1977, to 1.3 million a year later. Callaghan also bested Thatcher on the measure of personal popularity.

The economics, politics, polling and parliamentary arithmetic pointed to an autumn election.

Westminster and the country were simply waiting for Callaghan to give the go-ahead.

On 6 September 1978, Callaghan fuelled this speculation in a speech to the Trades Union Congress (TUC) conference. He delivered a rousing, partisan address – the sort of speech a prime minister delivers on the cusp of an election campaign.

Callaghan confirmed that he would indicate his electoral intentions “very shortly.” The prime minister said he understood that election speculation was “bound to happen once the Liberals withdrew”. But he urged the media to wait for an official pronouncement.

Callaghan proceeded to sing the rest of the chorus to the old music hall song.

“All at once he sent me round a note
”Here’s the very note, and this is what he wrote
“I can’t get away to marry you today,
”My wife won’t let me.”

After this musical interlude, Callaghan added: “Now let me just make clear that I have promised nobody that I shall be at the altar in October. Nobody at all.”

By all accounts, the prime ministerial pantomime failed to dampen the pre-election speculation. Many misinterpreted Callaghan’s cryptic-sounding sing-song.

On the evening of 7 September, Callaghan addressed an expectant nation. In an uncharacteristically pessimistic intervention, “Sunny Jim” said there would be no general election that autumn. Callaghan argued that his government should “continue to carry out policies that are consistent, determined, that don’t chop or change and that brought about the present recovery in our fortunes.”

The announcement was met with near-universal surprise. The bookies were reportedly already taking bets on the election’s outcome. Callaghan’s decision was predicated, in significant part, on his belief that he could secure an agreement with the trade unions on pay restraint. He then hoped that continued economic recovery would further improve Labour’s standing ahead of a spring election.

In hindsight, Callaghan’s decision not to call a snap election is considered a disastrous miscalculation. Within weeks, the country began its slow descent into the “Winter of Discontent” – a period of widespread industrial unrest and economic disruption.

In January 1979, Callaghan faced criticism for attending a four nation summit in Guadeloupe during the period of widespread industrial unrest. In the Caribbean, Callaghan held talks on the escalating crisis in Iran and the proposed SALT II arms control treaty with the Soviet Union. Afterwards, the prime minister took a short holiday in Barbados, where he was snapped swimming in the sun.

Upon landing back in the UK, with the press having gathered in the airport, Callaghan appeared to downplay the domestic situation. An Evening Standard reporter asked: “What of the mounting chaos in the country at the moment?”

Callaghan responded: “I promise if you look at it from the outside, I don’t think other people in the world would share the view that there is mounting chaos”.

Callaghan’s comment was memorably seized upon by the Sun newspaper, which subsequently ran the headline: “Crisis? What Crisis?”. The pointed paraphrase has been associated with Callaghan’s premiership ever since. Labour’s poll lead ultimately collapsed into a double-digit deficit, weakening Callaghan’s position in parliament.

On 17 January 1979, Thatcher addressed the nation in a party-political broadcast. The Conservative leader, delivering her lines from a sitting room, said that she did not want to use her broadcast to “make party political points”. Thatcher argued that the “crisis that our country faces is too serious for that.” She questioned what happened to Britain’s “sense of common nationhood and even of common humanity.”

No-confidence defeat and the 1979 general election

The trigger for the collapse of the Callaghan government was found in the 1979 devolution referenda.

As prime minister, Callaghan cautiously embraced devolution. He first introduced the Scotland and Wales Bill (before the legislation was split in two) at second reading in December 1976, arguing that devolution was a necessary response to the “movement of popular will”. The proposed legislation was built on the white paper entitled Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and Wales (1974), which responded to a royal commission on constitutional reform (1969-1973).

The Labour Party at large, however, remained divided. In Wales, the anti-devolution position was subscribed to by prominent Labour figures, including future leader Neil Kinnock. In Scotland, Tam Dalyell served as de facto leader of Labour’s anti-devolutionist tendency. He famously posed the “West Lothian question” (so-called after his constituency), which referred to the perceived imbalance between the voting rights in the House of Commons of MPs from Scottish and Welsh constituencies that would arise with devolution.

During the passage of the Scotland Bill, Labour MP George Cunningham inserted a critical amendment. Cunningham’s so-called “40% clause” required at least 40% of the total registered electorate to vote “Yes” in a referendum for the act to be implemented. The amendment, which was strongly opposed by the government, passed by 166 votes to 151. It provided for a double test: a majority in favour of an assembly, and a substantial turnout.

The 1979 referenda on the Scotland and Wales Acts amounted to debacles, albeit in disparate senses.

In Scotland, a narrow majority of 51.6% (1,230,937 votes) voted in favour of the proposed devolution scheme, with 48.4% (1,153,502) voting against. On a turnout of 63.8%, however, the ‘Yes’ vote represented only 32.9% of the electorate, failing to fulfil Cunningham’s wrecking clause. The referendum in Wales saw 79.7% of voters reject the proposals, with only 20.3% voting in favour. The turnout was 58.8%. Unlike in Scotland, the result was not subject to any ambiguity from the so-called ‘40% rule’.

In his memoir, Time and Chance, Callaghan noted: “[The 1979 Welsh devolution referendum was] held on St David’s Day, for [secretary of state for Wales] John Morris… had hoped the compliment would strike a patriotic chord in Welsh hearts. But the valleys were dead to the sound of our music and rejected the blandishments by a huge majority of four to one.”

SNP MPs withdrew their support for Callaghan’s minority Labour government in the aftermath of the 1979 referendum. The failure to deliver a devolved assembly, despite a numerical victory for the “Yes” campaign, was seen by pro-home rule campaigners as a democratic betrayal. In this context, the Liberal Party under David Steel also turned on the government.

On 28 March 1979, having chosen to put off an autumn election, Callaghan found the issue forced upon him. In one of the most dramatic nights in British political history, Callaghan’s government was defeated by a single vote in a motion of no confidence. The vote – 311 to 310 – was announced to raucous cheers from Conservative MPs just after 10:00 pm, marking the first time a government had been brought down on a confidence vote since 1924.

The government’s fate was effectively sealed when the 77-year-old Labour MP Sir Alfred Broughton, bedridden after a heart attack, was warned he might not survive the journey to Westminster. Initially, the government deputy chief whip, Walter Harrison, approached his opposite number, Conservative whip Bernard Weatherill, to secure a “pairing” agreement for Broughton. Weatherill rejected the suggestion that a Tory MP would agree to absent themselves as part of a pairing arrangement on such an important vote. But he acquiesced, honourably agreeing to abstain himself. Harrison said he would not hold Weatherill to this deal – a sacrifice that would have surely ended his political career. The demise of Callaghan’s government was gentlemanly, therefore.

Thatcher opened the debate as leader of the opposition. She moved the motion that “this House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government”.

Callaghan, in what would be one of his final contributions as prime minister, concluded: “Let need, not greed, be our motto. Our purpose as a government and as a party is to present a bold, socialist challenge to all these problems as we face these tasks. I ask for the confidence of the House and of the country so that we may continue with our work.”

The 311 MPs who voted “no confidence” in Callaghan’s government comprised 279 Conservatives, 13 Liberals, 11 SNP representatives, eight Ulster unionists (five Ulster Unionist Party, one United Ulster Unionist Party, one Democratic Unionist Party) and one independent. Two Ulster Unionist Party MPs, three Plaid Cymru MPs and two MPs of the breakaway Scottish Labour Party (SLP) voted against the motion tabled by the official opposition.

Speaking after the vote, Callaghan said that the government would “take our case to the country”.

At the time of parliament’s dissolution ahead of the 1979 general election, Callaghan remained the more popular of the two main party leaders, but the Conservative campaign relentlessly exploited public misgivings about the direction of the country. Thatcher campaigned on a platform of controlling inflation, curbing trade union power and reducing the role of the state in the economy.

A memorable Conservative Party campaign broadcast began with the Sun‘s “Crisis? What Crisis?” headline. The phrase was then repeated by an increasingly desperate-sounding voice actor. The broadcast was interspersed with film footage of piles of rubbish, closed factories, picketed hospitals and locked graveyards. On top of this, the famous “Labour Isn’t Working” poster – curated by advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi – probably captured the public mood.

Thatcher’s Conservatives ultimately secured 339 seats (up 62), securing a comfortable majority of 43. The Labour Party slumped to 269 seats (down 50). The swing to the Conservatives of 5.2 points was the largest since 1945.

Callaghan resigned as Labour leader 18 months after Labour’s 1979 general election defeat.

In November 1980, Michael Foot was elected leader of the Labour Party, securing a narrow victory over his main rival, Denis Healey, in the final ballot of Labour MPs. Healey, who served as chancellor of the exchequer from 1974 to 1979, was widely viewed as Callaghan’s likely heir, representing the social democratic right of the party. Foot, first elected alongside Callaghan as part of Labour’s post-war landslide in 1945, was firmly identified with the party left.

Foot later said he “pleaded” with Callaghan to stay on as Labour leader.

Speaking in 1999, Callaghan remarked that he would not be surprised if he was considered the worst prime minister for more than 200 years.

In an interview with The Oldie magazine, Callaghan said: “I think we are all re-evaluated as time goes by and I should not be the slightest bit surprised if there is another evaluation after I die and people come to the conclusion that I was the worst prime minister since [Robert] Walpole.”

In the same interview, Callaghan admitted his remarks in January 1979 – interpreted as “Crisis? What Crisis?” – had been “insensitive”.

He commented: “It was my fault in the sense that I was the leader of the country.

“I was the prime minister and we had got ourselves into a position that was really disgraceful. It was probably a combination of weak leadership among the trade unions and insensitivity on my part, but I must carry the can.

“I very much regret it. Even at my present age if I were to go back and be prime minister now I would certainly take more initiatives than I did then.”

Callaghan: late political career and retirement

Callaghan held the title of father of the House (afforded to the longest continuously serving MP) from 1983 to 1987.

Callaghan stood down from parliament at the 1987 general election. He was elevated to the House of Lords as Lord Callaghan of Cardiff shortly thereafter.

Callaghan retired to a farm he had purchased some years early near Ringmer in East Sussex.

In 2002, Callaghan celebrated his 90th birthday with Tony Blair at a party at Downing Street.

Death, tributes and legacy

Callaghan died on 26 March 2005, aged 92, following a long illness. His ashes were scattered in the flowerbed around the Peter Pan statue at Great Ormond Street Hospital in London.

Tony Blair, the next individual to serve as a Labour prime minister, led tributes to Callaghan in the House of Commons.

He said: “Jim Callaghan’s life almost spans the history of the entire Labour party. It was the Labour party’s values of social justice, solidarity and opportunity for all that brought him into the party and he worked tirelessly throughout the whole of his life to put them into action…

“He was a real patriot, but thanks to his experiences of the war, never confused patriotism with narrow nationalism. Britain was, of course, still at war when he was adopted and then elected as member of parliament for South Cardiff. He continued to serve that constituency and the city with great pride and affection for 42 years and took its name for his title when he went to the other place.”

Blair said Callaghan “needed all his personal qualities to hold together both the party and a parliamentary pact with the Liberals – a tribute to anyone’s patience.”

Michael Howard, the Conservative leader of the opposition, said Callaghan was “universally respected” and pointed to his “profound influence on the course of the political life of our nation across the entire latter half of the 20th century.”

He added: “Loyalty to principle, decency, humanity, sincerity: these are the attributes for which Lord Callaghan will be remembered and he will be sadly missed.”

Margaret Thatcher, the prime minister from 1979 to 1990, said: “Jim Callaghan was a formidable opponent, one who could best me across the dispatch box.

“In other circumstances he would have been a successful prime minister. He was a superb party manager. Despite our disagreements, I always respected him because I knew he was moved by deep patriotism.”

Rise to prominence

Callaghan entered parliament at the 1945 general election as the MP for Cardiff South (later Cardiff South East, and Cardiff South and Penarth), winning 17,489 votes (60.2%) and a majority of 5,944 over the incumbent Conservative candidate, Arthur Evans.

Callaghan, having entered as part of Labour’s post-war landslide, held a series of junior positions in Clement Attlee’s government (1945-1951). He was a junior minister at the Ministry of Transport (1947-1950) and in the Admiralty (1950-1951).

Callaghan, seen as a “Gaitskellite” figure on the social democratic right of the Labour Party, was elected to the shadow cabinet following the 1951 general election. He served in a series of frontbench roles as Labour spokesperson for transport (1951-1953), fuel and power (1953-1955), colonial affairs (1956-1961), and then as shadow chancellor from 1961 to 1964.

Callaghan stood unsuccessfully for the Labour deputy leadership in 1960 following the death of Aneurin “Nye” Bevan. George Brown, another standard-bearer for the party’s social democratic wing, won with 146 votes on the second ballot. Callaghan won 55 votes in the first ballot.

Callaghan endorsed Hugh Gaitskell in the simultaneous 1960 Labour leadership contest, triggered by Harold Wilson’s challenge.

Following Gaitskell’s sudden death, Callaghan stood in the 1963 Labour leadership contest. Callaghan was eliminated from the contest with 41 votes in the first ballot, placing behind both George Brown and Wilson.

Wilson, generally seen as a Bevanite figure, was elected as leader after securing 144 votes in the final ballot. Wilson’s success in the 1963 leadership contest has been attributed to splits on the right of the party (between supporters of Brown and Callaghan).

After Labour’s narrow victory in the 1964 general election, Callaghan was appointed as chancellor of the exchequer. On his Treasury desk, Callaghan found a note from outgoing chancellor Reginald Maudling. “Good luck, old cock”, it read. “Sorry to leave it in such a mess”.

Callaghan was chancellor at the time of the 1966 general election.

Shortly before the 1966 campaign began, Callaghan delivered a ‘little’ or ‘mini’ budget. He pledged a scheme of tax rebates for mortgage holders and the decimalisation of sterling in the next parliament, which he described as a “momentous and an historic decision”. Callaghan used his parliamentary platform to proclaim good economic tidings. He noted the deficit had been cut from over £750 million in 1964 to approximately £350 million in 1965. The trade deficit, meanwhile, was slashed by half. Gold and dollar reserves stood at £1,303 million at the end of February, an increase of £225 million on the previous month.

In the end, Labour secured a decisive general election victory, winning a comfortable parliamentary majority of 98.

However, Callaghan’s tenure as chancellor (1964-1967) ended in crisis.

Callaghan had inherited a trade deficit of £800 million from the Conservatives in 1964 and, ultimately in vain, fought for three years to maintain the pound’s position. Both Callaghan and Wilson initially resisted altering Britain’s exchange rate, and sterling’s defence was described as a central pillar of the government’s economic policy. Callaghan understood the damaging political implications of devaluation. It would necessitate stringent austerity measures to control demand in the economy, stabilising the balance of payments.

The events leading up to the 1967 devaluation amounted to a debacle. Wilson accepted Callaghan’s decision to devalue on 15 November, and it was agreed that Callaghan would announce the government’s position three days later on 18 November. The chancellor, however, was called before MPs on 16 November to make a statement on rumours the government was seeking to shore up sterling with a “$1,000 million loan being negotiated with foreign banks.”

Callaghan was bound by commons rules not to mislead the House, but could not risk the economic and political consequences of a premature announcement. His refusal to repeat previous denials, however, led to further selling of sterling on world markets. In the 24 hours that followed, the Bank of England spent hundreds of millions of pounds in a futile attempt to prop up the currency.

The government’s official devaluation announcement followed as planned on 18 November. A Treasury press notice outlined the government’s decision that “in order to achieve a substantial surplus on the balance of payments consistent with economic growth and full employment, the exchange rate of the £ should be lowered”. A series of measures were outlined in order to achieve “an improvement in our balance of payments of at least £500 million a year”. The bank rate was immediately raised to 8%, banks were asked to limit advances to all but “priority borrowers, especially exporters”, and defence spending was cut by £100 million. Additionally, hire purchase regulations on car sales were tightened, requiring a minimum deposit of 33.3% and a maximum repayment period of 27 months.

Callaghan returned to the commons on 20 November to make a statement on his devaluation decision and the accompanying austerity measures. He explained that devaluation would make imports more expensive, leading to a “small but noticeable rise in prices”.

Callaghan ultimately felt compelled to resign. In his memoirs, Callaghan recorded that, when the devaluation policy was being decided, he “had already intimated to the prime minister that it was my firm decision to resign once the devaluation operation was complete and I had accounted for myself to the House of Commons.”

He added: “The prime minister urged me very strongly to remain at the Treasury for the time being, but I felt unable to do so in view of the undertakings I had given in good faith as lately as the previous September that sterling would not be devalued.”

In a cabinet reshuffle, Roy Jenkins was appointed as the new chancellor; Callaghan moved to the Home Office.

The devaluation eventually succeeded in bringing the balance of payments into surplus by 1969.

As home secretary, Callaghan played a key role in the passing of the Race Relations Act 1968, which made it illegal to refuse housing, employment or public services because of an individual’s race. Presenting the bill to parliament, Callaghan said that the House had “rarely faced an issue of greater social significance for our country and our children.”

Callaghan also stewarded the Representation of the People Act 1968 through parliament. This landmark piece of legislation, sometimes referred to as the Sixth Reform Act, lowered the voting age in the United Kingdom from 21 to 18. Speaking during the bill’s commons second reading debate, Callaghan described 18 as “an age which appeals to the government as being appropriate for the casting of a vote.”

Callaghan’s tenure as home secretary coincided with the deterioration of the security situation in Northern Ireland. In August 1969, Callaghan authorised the the deployment of troops onto the streets of Northern Ireland, marking the beginning of the British Army’s longest continuous operation, Operation Banner. Operation Banner was initially intended as a “limited operation” to restore order. But it signalled the beginning of a larger role for the UK government in Northern Ireland, paving the way for the imposition of ‘direct rule’ on 28 March 1972.

Callaghan was home secretary when the House of Commons voted to permanently abolish the death penalty for murder. During the historic debate in December 1969, Callaghan argued that the murder rate had remained “remarkably stable” during the five-year suspension or “trial” period, varying between a low of 114 and a peak of 154 in the years between 1957 and 1968.

Callaghan concluded: “There are times when parliament has to act in advance of public opinion and give a lead. On penal questions it is not uncommonly the case: parliament has done it before and parliament was not wrong.

“Let us give a lead again today.”

MPs voted with 343 in favour and 185 against – a majority of 158 – to permanently end hanging in Britain

The Conservative Party under Edward Heath’s leadership won the 1970 general election. The result, which gave the Conservatives a majority of 30, was one of the biggest electoral shocks of the post-war era. In the final phase of the campaign, the national mood appeared to turn following the publication of poor trade figures showing a £31 million trade deficit for May. Heath’s campaign focused on a message of economic competence and a promise to curb the power of the trade unions. The Conservative leader referred to a “shopping basket election”, hoping to capitalise on concerns over the cost of living. Controversially, he warned that Labour’s re-election could result in sterling facing a second devaluation.

Callaghan subsequently served as shadow home secretary (1970-1971), shadow employment secretary (1971-1972) and shadow foreign secretary (1972-1974).

After the February 1974 general election returned a minority Labour government, Callaghan was appointed as foreign secretary. In this capacity, he played a prominent role in the 1975 referendum, which confirmed Britain’s membership of the European Economic Community. Callaghan supported the “Yes” campaign in defiance of his party’s eurosceptic elements. During a speech to a special Labour conference in April 1975, Callaghan was interrupted by shouts of “Rubbish!”

Callaghan was foreign secretary at the time Wilson announced his resignation as prime minister in March 1976.

Personal life

Leonard James Callaghan was born on 27 March 1912 in Portsmouth, Hampshire. He grew up in Cardiff. His father, an officer in the Royal Navy, died when Callaghan was only nine.

Callaghan attended Portsmouth Northern Grammar School and in 1929 he joined the civil service as a clerk in an Inland Revenue office in Maidstone.

Callaghan joined the Labour Party in 1931 and became a full-time union official in 1936.

Callaghan volunteered with the Royal Navy during the Second World War, serving with the East Indies fleet and later being commissioned as a lieutenant in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. At the end of the war, Callaghan stood as a Labour candidate in the 1945 general election.

Family

Callaghan met his future wife, Audrey Moulton, during his time working as a tax inspector in the early-1930s. They were married in July 1938.

The couple had three children, one of whom, Margaret Jay, became a senior Labour politician in her own right.

Jay was appointed to the peerage in 1992, serving in the upper chamber alongside her father. She served as a health minister (1997-1998), minister for women (1998-2001) and leader of the House of Lords (1998-2001).

Trivia: things you might not know about James Callaghan

Comments on nuclear deterrence and retaliation

Callaghan was prime minister at a time of heightened tension with the Soviet Union. He is said to be the only prime minister to have spoken publicly about his decision-making regarding a possible retaliatory nuclear strike.

In 1988, he told the BBC: “If it were to become necessary or vital, it would have meant the deterrent had failed, because the value of the nuclear weapon is frankly only as a deterrent. But if we had got to that point, where it was, I felt, necessary to do it, then I would have done it.

“I’ve had terrible doubts, of course, about this. I say to you, if I had lived after having pressed that button, I could never, ever have forgiven myself.”

‘What more could I do?’

In his diary entry of 3 April 1997, Tony Benn recorded that Callaghan received a call from a Labour Party volunteer asking if he wanted to become more active in the party. According to Benn, Callaghan responded: “Well I was a Labour prime minister – what more could I do?”.