On 25 May 1995, the Liberal Democrat leader, Paddy Ashdown, formally abandoned the party’s strategy of ‘equidistance’ between the Conservative and Labour parties. The policy shift, endorsed by the party’s federal executive, positioned the Liberal Democrats as being prepared to cooperate with Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’.
The contemporary Conservative government, led by John Major as prime minister, was deeply unpopular and facing internal divisions over Europe. On 4 May 1995, the Conservatives suffered a catastrophic defeat in the local elections, losing over 2,000 councillors and control of dozens of councils.
The rise of Blair and New Labour, meanwhile, appeared to present an opportunity for progressive cooperation.
In an article for the Independent, published on 26 May, Ashdown argued that the recent local elections proved the country had run out of patience with the Conservatives. He explicitly ruled out the prospect of a Con-Lib pact, writing: “If, when the election finally comes, the Conservatives lose their majority in parliament, but seek our support to stay in office, they will not receive it”.
In the piece, entitled “Why I won’t let Major in”, Ashdown added: “Liberal Democrats are the guarantee of change in Britain… Our position now is quite clear: no quarter for the Tories, no let-up on Labour.”
The ‘equidistance’ policy held that the Liberal Democrats were ideologically positioned in the centre ground and equally willing/unwilling to form a coalition with either of the two main parties. It allowed the new party to articulate a political identity, albeit in ‘negative’ terms.
***
The Liberal Democrats were formed in March 1988, following a merger between the Social Democratic Party (SDP) – which split from Labour – and the old Liberal Party. Ashdown was elected as the party’s first leader in July 1988. During his leadership campaign, Ashdown had argued that the Liberal Democrats (then called the Social and Liberal Democrats) should seek to to replace the Labour Party as the leading non-Conservative party in British politics.
In a speech delivered in November 1991, Ashdown set out his position ahead of the following year’s general election. “Is Labour better than the Tories?”, he asked, “Or are the Tories better than Labour? The answer is simple. They’re just as bad as each other!”
It was a trenchant restatement of his party’s equidistance policy. The Liberal Democrats secured 20 seats (down two) at the 1992 general election on 17.8% of the vote.
Following the 1992 campaign, Ashdown delivered what became known as the “Chard speech”. Speaking in Chard, a small town in his Yeovil constituency, Ashdown described the role the Lib Dems would seek to play in the coming parliament.
Ashdown defined a threefold mandate for his party: to create “the force powerful enough to remove the Tories; to assemble the policies capable of sustaining a different government; and to draw together the forces in Britain which will bring change and reform.”
He added: “Many of the imperfections and injustices in our political system – the overweening power of the executive, the absence of proper protection for personal liberty, unfair voting, excessive secrecy, a Conservative-dominated press, the centralisation of power – all these were tolerated by many in Britain, precisely because, from time to time, power changed hands.
“Are they still to be tolerated if Britain is becoming a one-party state? Are we prepared to be witness to the slow death of pluralism within our democracy?”
He urged his party “to work with others to assemble the ideas around which a non-socialist alternative to the Conservatives can be constructed.”
Specifically, he called for a national electoral reform commission “to consider the most appropriate form of proportional voting”.
He concluded: “What we need is a new forum and a debate on a much wider scale – one which is owned by no particular party and encompasses many who take no formal part in politics, but wish to see a viable alternative to Conservatism in Britain.”
The speech marked the beginning of the end of the old ‘equidistance’ position.
***
Upon Blair’s election as Labour leader, Ashdown recorded in his diary: “I have been building the party to fill a certain gap in politics, which I know is there and which would give us real electoral pull. But then along comes Blair with all the power of Labour behind him, and fills exactly the space I have been aiming at for the last seven years.”
In April 1996, he added: “If, as it appears, I have more in common with Blair than he has with his left wing, surely the logical thing is for us to create a new, more powerful alternative force which would be unified around a broadly liberal agenda”.
The shift from equidistance was not approved without controversy. Some within the party feared it would alienate traditional voters who were equally opposed to Labour and would undermine the party’s distinct identity. One Liberal Democrat MP, David Russell Johnston, referred to the Chard speech as a “burnt offering”.
In November 1996, Elizabeth Lynne, the MP for Rochdale, alongside 16 senior Liberal Democrats, including local council leaders and parliamentary candidates, wrote to Ashdown to protest the party’s direction.
The letter, addressed to the Lib Dem leader, read: “We need assurances that the party is not going to be sold out for a handful of Cabinet seats. If this were to be the case you certainly would not have our support on it. We are an independent party and must remain so.”
It added: “We are totally opposed to any pact or coalition with Labour before or after the next general election and feel that this is in actual fact what you are working towards.
“We don’t believe that you will be able to carry the party with you and it will lead to inevitable splits which could irreparably damage the Liberal Democrats.”
In March 1996, the Liberal Democrat and Labour parties began a series of talks on constitutional reform, led by Robin Cook (Labour) and Robert Maclennan (Lib Dems).
The group reported in March 1997. It agreed on proposals such as incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into UK law – which would bear fruit as the Human Rights Act 1998; freedom of information legislation – later the Freedom of Information Act 2000; and further constitutional reforms, including devolution, reform of the House of Lords, as well as a referendum on the voting reform for Westminster elections (to be agreed in a commission – later the ‘Jenkins commission’). Collectively, these proposals were referred to as the Cook/Maclennan agreement.
Senior Labour and Liberal Democrat politicians had also worked together in the cross-party Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC), which set out to design a devolution scheme. The SCC (1988-1995) was co-chaired by Harry Ewing, a Labour politician, and David Steel, a former leader of the Liberal Party.
Publicly, Ashdown denied any attempt to form a coalition with Labour. He told the Guardian in April 1997: “If you think that the purpose of my life is to snuggle up to Tony Blair so that I can stick my bum on a government Daimler, just get off that idea”.
Ashdown added: “What I’m interested in is how can I use the force that I have made in this party over eight hard years to participate in the process of change.”
Cross-party cooperation during the 1997 general election campaign was mostly tacit, despite private discussions over publishing a common programme. Ashdown is said to have drafted successive versions of a Lib-Lab ‘Partnership for Britain’s Future’. Opinion polling, however, suggested that the electoral risks of such explicit co-operation were too great.
The Mirror, the leading Labour-supporting tabloid, endorsed Liberal Democrat candidates in constituencies where Blair’s party could not win. Labour consciously steered clear of Lib Dem target seats. And both parties withdrew their candidate in Tatton, clearing the way for BBC journalist Martin Bell’s successful campaign versus disgraced Conservative MP Neil Hamilton.
The 1997 Liberal Democrat manifesto, entitled Make the Difference, said that 18 years of Conservative government had left “our society divided, our public services run down, our sense of community fractured and our economy under-performing.”
The extent of tactical voting, implicitly encouraged by the Liberal Democrat and Labour campaigns, was unprecedented at the 1997 election.
The result, a landslide Labour victory, meant Blair could govern comfortably without the need for cooperation with smaller parties. The contest also marked a watershed moment for the Liberal Democrats. The party increased its representation from 18 to 46 MPs – the best Liberal showing since the days of David Lloyd George.
Blair, notwithstanding his historic 179-seat majority, constituted a ‘Lib-Lab’ cabinet committee. The joint cabinet committee (JCC) included senior Labour and Liberal Democrat politicians, with a remit encompassing constitutional reform proposals. It was attended by Liberal Democrats Alan Beith, Robert Maclennan, Lord Holme, and Menzies Campbell.
Blair was announced as its chair, attending alongside Labour’s John Prescott, Gordon Brown, Robin Cook, Jack Straw and Ann Taylor. Ashdown said the committee heralded a “rational, mature and civilised style of politics… the real beginning of a different style from which we all benefit”.
A Downing Street spokesperson said: “On issues of mutual concern, the most obvious being the constitution, there is no reason why [the Liberal Democrats] should not have an input.”
By November 1998, the committee had met six times. Its remit was later expanded to cover a number of specific European policy issues.
***
In December 1997, the JCC launched the Independent Commission on the Voting System, chaired by Lord (Roy) Jenkins, co-founder of the SDP.
The so-called Jenkins commission was given a broad terms of reference, allowing it to “consider and recommend any appropriate system or combination of systems in recommending an alternative to the present system for parliamentary elections to be put before the people in the government’s referendum.”
It was instructed to “observe the requirement for broad proportionality, the need for stable government, an extension of voter choice and the maintenance of a link between MPs and geographical constituencies.”
The commission reported in September 1998. It proposed a shift from the first past the post electoral system to an alternative vote ‘top-up’ scheme or AV+. Under the system set out by Jenkins commission, 80-85% of the commons would be elected under the alternative vote (AV), a ranked choice, constituency-based system. The remaining 15-20% of MPs – the ‘top-up’ – would be elected under a party-list proportional representation system.
The commission concluded: “FPTP exaggerates movements of opinion, and when they are strong produces mammoth majorities in the House of Commons. Since the war it has done this for Labour in 1945, 1966 (less sweepingly) and 1997, and for the Conservatives in 1959, 1983 and 1987.”
It added: “The commission’s central recommendation is that the best alternative for Britain to the existing first past the post system is a two-vote mixed system which can be described as either limited AMS or AV Top-up.
“The majority of MPs (80 to 85%) would continue to be elected on an individual constituency basis, with the remainder elected on a corrective Top-up basis which would significantly reduce the disproportionality and the geographical divisiveness which are inherent in FPTP.”
Ashdown referred to the recommendation as “a historic step forward”. But critics of the Lib Dem leader noted his inability to secure a commitment to a more straightforward proportional electoral system, the party’s official policy. Nor did Labour set about implementing the Jenkins commission’s recommendations.
MPs considered the recommendations of the Jenkins commission during a debate in November 1998. Opening the debate for the government, Jack Straw, the home secretary described the proposed AV+ system as “ingenious”, but noted that it had “no parallel anywhere in the world”.
He remarked that MPs could be “forgiven for not fully anticipating its prospect.”
Straw reaffirmed his own support for retaining FPTP, stating that he was “unpersuaded of the case for change”. He also criticised the proposed “top-up” element of the system, pointing to the need for “spares” in the event an MP elected under this mechanism died.
Conservative frontbencher Liam Fox referred to the Jenkins commission as a “rigged commission – a sham process – which might as well have begun with its conclusions and worked backwards towards its remit.”
Fox argued that first past the post offered voters a clear and decisive mechanism for removing unpopular governments. “Our system – sadly, on some occasions – gives voters an easy way to send the removal vans to No. 10, as they did last year”, he said.
“We cannot resent that.”
Veteran Labour MP Tony Benn restated his opposition to proportional representation, arguing that the strength of the British electoral system lay in the direct accountability between MPs and their constituents – whom he referred to as “our employer”.
Benn argued that pre-election coalitions (those formed within the Labour and Conservative parties) were “transparent”, ensuring “people can see them developing and know what they are voting for and what their own member thinks”.
***
In the late 1990s, following successful referendums, the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly were established and elected using the additional member system. The Good Friday Agreement created the Northern Ireland Assembly, elected by the single transferable vote.
The Greater London Authority Act 1999 established a London Assembly elected by AMS, with a 5% threshold, alongside a directly elected mayor chosen using the supplementary vote.
Donald Dewar, the inaugural first minister of Scotland, announced his first cabinet in May 1999, which included two Liberal Democrat MSPs. Jim Wallace became deputy first minister and minister for justice; fellow Liberal Democrat Ross Finnie served as minister for rural affairs.
This Lib-Lab partnership proved remarkably stable, lasting through two elections and three different Labour first ministers (Dewar, Henry McLeish, and Jack McConnell) until the SNP’s rise to power in 2007.
Following the inaugural 1999 election to the National Assembly for Wales, first secretary Alun Michael led a minority Labour administration. His successor, Rhodri Morgan, formed a “Coalition Partnership” with the Welsh Liberal Democrats in October 2000. This agreement saw Liberal Democrat leader Michael German appointed as deputy first minister and minister for economic development, while fellow Liberal Democrat Jenny Randerson served as minister for culture. (The partnership lasted until the 2003 election.)
Ashdown later revealed that he and Blair had secretly considered the prospect of forming a coalition government at Westminster for up to 18 months after the 1997 election. He went as far as to propose the reconstruction of the House of Commons to reflect the principles of the new Blair-Ashdown/Lib-Lab “project”.
In a letter to Blair dated 6 July 1998, Ashdown argued that the leaders needed to counter accusations that a coalition would be a “grubby deal between parties, rather than something in the interests of the nation”.
He added: “One way of dealing with this is to openly recognise it and say that we are concerned about it too. That is why we intend to make it a specific aim of the project, to restore the importance of parliament and open a new culture of consultation, pluralism, debate and even disagreement.
“And as a symbol of this we might even say we shall alter the shape of parliament itself, turning it into a hemisphere and setting up a design competition to do this before the Millennium.”
In a memo to the prime minister, Jonathan Powell, Blair’s chief of staff, responded: “I can’t believe that he has proposed a hemispherical House of Commons. Are you sure you want to go ahead with this project?”
In a September 1998 interview, Ashdown told the Independent: “[Blair] is a man on a journey. What he calls the ‘third way’, I call liberalism.”
He added: “We are in the most fluid period of politics we have seen in the last half-century. The Procrustean beds in which Labour and Tory MPs are forced to lie are manifestly incapable of maintaining them. Sooner or later British politics will be reshaped.”
***
The 1997 to 1999 period saw Ashdown come under significant internal pressure over his perceived proximity to Blair and the New Labour project. At the Liberal Democrat Spring convention in Southport in March 1998, members passed a resolution that “triple-locked” the party leader.
The “Southport Resolution” established that any “substantial proposal which could affect the party’s independence of political action” now required the assent of 75% of both Liberal Democrat MPs and the party’s federal executive.
Alternatively, a coalition could be endorsed by a simple majority of MPs and the federal executive – but only if a resolution was backed by two-thirds of delegates at a special party conference. If the conference agreed by less than two-thirds, then it could be progressed with the support of a simple majority of party members in a special ballot.
The resolution, drafted by veteran Liberal Gordon Lishman, was designed to stop Ashdown bouncing the party into coalition against its will – as some critics conceived of his approach to the joint cabinet committee.
Charles Kennedy, a Liberal Democrat critic of Lib-Lab intimacy, said the Southport “safeguards” served to reassure “people like me who were extremely anxious” about the prospect of coalition.
This “triple lock” process was later used to approve a coalition deal with the Conservative Party in May 2010, during Nick Clegg’s tenure as Liberal Democrat leader.
Ashdown stepped down as Liberal Democrat leader in August 1999. He maintained that his resignation had long been telegraphed to allies, including Blair as prime minister, but it took Westminster by surprise.
In his resignation letter, Ashdown stated: “This has not been an easy decision to make. I shall lay all this down with great sadness. But also with some sense of achievement.”
He told BBC News: “The party was a wreckage 11 years ago. When I hand the party over I want to make sure it is firmly and properly established and it is a strong party going on the up.
“Too many leaders go when they are kicked out or carried out. I have always said that I will go when people say, ‘Why are you going?’ not ‘Why aren’t you going?’.”
Under Ashdown’s leadership, the Liberal Democrats overtook the Conservatives to become the second largest party in local government with 4,600 councillors.
Ashdown was succeeded by Kennedy.
Kennedy was previously described as “Ashdown’s Hezza” – the Michael Heseltine to his Margaret Thatcher.
Unsurprisingly then, the new Lib Dem leader was not considered to be Ashdown’s preferred successor.
Kennedy effectively suspended the joint cabinet committee in the run-up to the 2001 general election. The JCC was formally wound up in January 2002.
In 2003, Kennedy told the Independent: “I think the box marked ‘JCC’ is going to remain firmly with its lid closed for the rest of this parliament…
“If the phone went this afternoon and he [Blair] put proportional representation on the table, then I would happily agree to a meeting of the JCC to discuss that. But I am not planning my diary on that basis. I don’t think Tony is either.”
He added: “We do much better if we don’t get into hung parliaments and coalitions because it just muddies the water and blunts our message completely.
“Far better to put your case forward crisply, cleanly, invite people to support it and say ‘However many votes and MPs we get, we will use that influence to push forward as much of that agenda as we can’.”
***
In November 1999, Ashdown told BBC Radio 4 that discussions over a possible Lib-Lab coalition continued for some time after the 1997 general election – despite Blair’s landslide majority.
Ashdown stated: “It’s true to say that Tony Blair and I had planned and prepared for the possibility of a coalition cabinet. And it’s true to say that the size of the Labour majority disturbed those plans.
“It’s not true however to say – it may not generally be known – that all thoughts of a coalition cabinet vanished at that point. I said to the prime minister – incidentally before I said to anyone else except my wife – that this Rubicon of the two parties working together in government was a Rubicon I still wanted to cross.
“And I believe he wanted to cross it. And I believe it could be crossed in this parliament. And on at least two occasions there were moments when that could have been done, for which we jointly prepared.
“It could have happened in the autumn of that year [1997] and it could have happened around the Jenkins proposals on proportional representation [in October 1998].”
Ashdown stood down as the MP for Yeovil in May 2001, and was elevated to the House of Lords in July.
In a 2009 interview with broadcaster Iain Dale, Lord Ashdown defended his decision to abandon ‘equidistance’.
He said: “In 1992, I absolutely didn’t want a hung parliament because I thought that combining with Neil Kinnock would give a one shot Labour government and we would suffer even more.
“I thought the biggest advantage to us came from a Labour defeat and I was planning my Chard Speech well in advance of 1992…
“I was a risk taker, and I laid my cards on the table in 1997 very clearly when I abandoned equidistance. That was always an uncomfortable position for us but it gave us cover in ’92. But even then people knew that we couldn’t have combined with Major.
“In ’97 we said we would form a partnership government. It all depends on the unpopularity of Labour. If Labour is popular and the toxic effect of voting Liberal and therefore assisting Labour in our seats, i.e Tory seats is minimised – and Blair minimised it – then it is possible to do that.”
Lord Ashdown died on 22 December 2018 at the age of 77. He had been suffering with bladder cancer.
Ed Davey, who was elected Lib Dem leader in 2020, has said he rejects “the idea of equidistance”.
During the 2020 Liberal Democrat leadership contest, Davey wrote: “Just as Paddy Ashdown did in the 1990s, I reject the idea of equidistance. I’m an anti-Conservative politician and have spent my life fighting the Tories, and winning.
“That’s how I would lead the party.”