On 6 March 1984, the National Coal Board (NCB), a government agency, publicly announced its plan to close 20 “uneconomic” pits with the loss of 20,000 jobs. This proclamation precipitated the year-long miners’ strike – one of the most significant industrial and political conflicts in modern British history.

The announcement, at the direction of NCB chairman Ian MacGregor, transformed what had been a concentrated dispute at the endangered Cortonwood colliery in Yorkshire into a national crisis. Miners in some Yorkshire pits walked out on 5 March in response to the imminent closure of their local collieries.

Between 6 March 1984 and 3 March 1985, some 140,000 out of Britain’s 187,000 working coal miners walked out. A widespread slogan during this period was “close a pit, kill a community”.

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The 1984-1985 strike represented the culmination of years of preparation by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government. Thatcher was determined to avoid a repeat of the defeats inflicted on Edward Heath’s government by the miners in the early 1970s.

In 1977, while the party remained in opposition, Conservative MP Nicholas Ridley drew up a report on how to defeat the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). The so-called “Ridley plan” discussed the likely opposition to Thatcher’s planned industrial reforms, outlining a strategy for suppressing resistance.

The report assumed that trade unions and political opponents would attempt to disrupt Thatcher’s policy programme, most likely through strikes. It predicted “challenge between 6 months and 10 months after the election” and set out four distinct casus belli.

The possible conflict triggers included an “unreasonable” wage claim, redundancies or closures, the government’s policy for the nationalised industries, or “some other political issue”. In any case, Ridley predicted that some “issue of discontent will be found, where feeling is strong, and the full force of the communist disruptors be used to exploit that discontent.” He contended that the most likely area for resistance was the coal industry.

Ridley recommended that the government should build up large coal stocks at power stations, make contingency plans to import coal, and ensure alternative transport arrangements. The report also stressed the need to respond firmly to violent picketing. It proposed the use of a “large, mobile squad of police who are equipped and prepared to uphold the law against the likes of the Saltley Coke-works mob.”

The “Battle of Saltley Gate” was arguably the central event of the 1972 miners’ strike.

Finally, Ridley suggested that the government employs “some haulage companies to recruit some good non-union drivers who will be prepared to cross picket lines, with police protection.”

The report was ultimately leaked and published by the Economist in May 1978.

The 1979 Conservative Party manifesto argued that trade unions were “dominated by a handful of extremists who do not reflect the common-sense views of most union members.”

Following the 1979 general election, the Final Report of the Nationalised Industries Policy Group was operationalised. According to Ridley’s designs, the government stockpiled coal and prepared new trade union legislation to ensure it could withstand a prolonged dispute.

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Arthur Scargill, national president of the NUM since 1982, denounced the pit closure plan as a “butchery of the industry” and set about turning the local action into a national fight. Scargill argued that no pit should close if it had coal reserves. Moreover, he claimed there was a “secret hit-list” comprising plans for 75 closures. (This fact may have been confirmed in 2014 when old cabinet papers were released by the National Archives.)

On 12 March 1984, Scargill declared the NUM’s support for the regional strikes in Yorkshire and Scotland, and called for action from NUM members in all other areas. Controversially, Scargill chose not to hold a national ballot. He is said to have been reluctant to put the membership’s opinion to the test, having previously lost three national strike ballots.

This lack of a formal mandate caused divisions within the NUM and high court challenges over the strike’s legality. The decision led to the formation of the Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM), which reportedly formed ties with the Thatcher government.

The strike saw high levels of violence. At Orgreave coking plant in South Yorkshire on 18 June 1984, the NUM deployed 5,000 pickets from across the UK to prevent strike-breaking lorries from accessing the site. They faced approximately 6,000 police in riot gear, police horses and dogs. At the Battle of Orgreave, as it has come to be known, 51 pickets and 72 policemen were injured. A total of 93 arrests were made.

At the time, Scargill said that police on horseback had charged “into our people, we’ve had people hit with truncheons and people kicked to the ground.”

Some years later, the union leader wrote: “The fundamental difference between Saltley in 1972 and Orgreave in 1984 was that in 1972 following the first closure at Saltley, picketing on my demand was increased the following day – while at Orgreave, on 19 June 1984, the pickets were completely withdrawn by the NUM Yorkshire and Derbyshire areas and other coalfield leaders, despite my desperate urging that picketing be stepped up.

“Had picketing at Orgreave been increased the day after 18 June, I have no doubt that Orgreave – and Scunthorpe – would have faced immediate closure, forcing the government to settle the strike.”

On 19 June, Thatcher was asked about the “ugly scenes of violence on the picket line at Orgreave”.

Addressing the House of Commons at prime minister’s questions, Thatcher argued that “​​the scenes at Orgreave yesterday had nothing to do with peaceful picketing”.

She added: “However serious the strike – and it is serious – the consequences of giving in to mob rule would be far graver. Thanks to the courage of the police, yesterday’s attempt failed. I agree with my hon. Friend that the law must be, and will continue to be, upheld.”

Neil Kinnock, the Labour leader of the opposition, stated that Thatcher’s “absolutism” had “brought violent conflict on a scale that has virtually been unknown in this country, certainly for the past 50 years or more.”

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On 19 July, Thatcher delivered a famous address to the 1922 committee of Conservative backbenchers in which she compared the Falklands War and the ongoing dispute in the mining industry.

The Times reported: “Speaking at a private meeting of the 1922 committee of Conservative backbench MPs at Westminster, Mrs Thatcher said that at the time of the conflict they had had to fight the enemy without; but the enemy within, much more difficult to fight, was just as dangerous to liberty.”

In September 1984, a high court judge ruled that the miners’ strike was unlawful on the grounds that no ballot had been held. Scargill dismissed the court’s findings, describing them as “another attempt by an unelected judge to interfere in the union’s affairs.”

In late 1984, the National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers union (NACODS) called off a planned strike after negotiating a deal with the NCB. This decision underlined the NUM’s isolation.

The miners began to go back to work in large numbers in February 1985. By this point, 9542 strike related arrests had been made, with 7755 people charged and 3817 convictions. Then, on 3 March 1985, the NUM’s executive narrowly agreed to end the long-running industrial dispute by 98 votes to 91. The union had made no headway with its demands.

Scargill told a news conference: “We have decided to go back for a whole range of reasons. One of the reasons is that the trade union movement of Britain with a few notable exceptions has left this union isolated.

“Another reason is that we face not an employer but a government aided and abetted by the judiciary, the police and you people in the media and at the end of this time our people are suffering tremendous hardship.”

Michael Eaton, the NCB’s chief spokesperson, responded: “There is no victory. The coal industry has lost, it’s the victim. We have lost markets, we have lost good labour relations over the course of this dispute.”

Thatcher expressed her relief, saying she wanted a return to a “prosperous coal industry”.

The prime minister added: “The miners would have been back earlier if the strike had not been kept going by intimidation and I am very glad now they can go back.”

At the time, the Treasury estimated the strike had cost the country £1.5 billion.

The effective defeat of the miners marked the end of an era for Britain’s trade union movement. The planned pit closure programme was implemented. And by 1994 only 15 of the 174 pits remained open. The remnants of Britain’s coal industry were privatised.

The strike helped cement Thatcher’s reputation as the “Iron Lady”.

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Responding to Thatcher’s death in 2013, NUM secretary Chris Kitchen said he would not shed a tear for someone responsible for the “vindictive acts she did to myself, my comrades and my family and for the mining community”.

In January 2014, Lisa Nandy, the Labour MP for Wigan, called on David Cameron as prime minister to apologise for the government’s actions during the 1984-1985 miners’ strike.

The question came as cabinet papers revealed that Thatcher called for contingency plans to be formulated over the use of military personnel to move coal stocks. At the time, Thatcher was presented with a list of “worst case” options, including power cuts and the prospect of placing British industry on a “three-day week”.

Nandy asked Cameron: “This month, cabinet papers have revealed that the Thatcher government sought to escalate the miners’ strike, close pits and undermine solidarity. The scars from that dispute run deep in communities such as Wigan, where some families have never recovered and where people have died while waiting for justice.

“Thirty years on, those communities deserve the truth and an apology. Why are they still waiting?”

The prime minister responded: “I have to say that if anyone needs to make an apology for their role in the miners’ strike, it should be Arthur Scargill for the appalling way in which he led that union.

“While we are at it, if we want to ask about other people’s roles, there was the role of the then leader of the Labour Party, who at the time never condemned the fact that they would not hold a ballot. So I think there are lessons for Labour to learn, and judging by their performance today, they have not learned any of them.”

In October 2016, Amber Rudd, the then home secretary, decided not to open an inquiry into the events at Orgreave during the 1984 miners’ strike. She said that there was “not a sufficient basis for me to instigate either a statutory inquiry or an independent review”.

Rudd stated: “This has been a difficult decision to make, and one which I have thought about very carefully. I have now concluded that there is not a sufficient basis for me to instigate either a statutory inquiry or an independent review.

“I know that this decision will come as a significant disappointment to the Orgreave Truth and Justice Campaign and its supporters.”

Diane Abbott, the shadow home secretary, said the lack of an inquiry was a “grave injustice”.

Labour MP Andy Burnham condemned an “establishment stitch-up”.