On 28 May 1974, the Northern Ireland executive created by the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed after the unionist members, led by the chief executive Brian Faulkner, resigned in the face of a seven-day loyalist strike.
The collapse marked the failure of the agreement – the first major attempt to re-establish devolved government in Northern Ireland since the imposition of direct rule in March 1972.
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The Conservative government led by Edward Heath, which had imposed direct rule one year previously, published a new white paper entitled Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals on 20 March 1973. It set out plans for a devolved, power-sharing assembly in Northern Ireland, alongside a Council of Ireland to consider cross-border matters with the Republic of Ireland.
The new assembly, established under the Northern Ireland Assembly Act 1973, met for the first time on 31 July 1973.
The Sunningdale compact was agreed later that year. It created a cross-party executive, made up of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and the Alliance (APNI).
Faulkner led the Sunningdale negotiations on behalf of the UUP, and was appointed as chief executive of Northern Ireland under the scheme. Critically, agreement was also reached to establish a cross-border Council of Ireland to foster cooperation with the Republic of Ireland. The council would grant the Republic limited jurisdiction over issues of joint concern between north and south.
However, this cross-border element was fiercely opposed by loyalists and hardline unionist politicians who viewed it as a step towards a united Ireland. The so-called ‘Dublin-dimension’, it was feared, would see the unionist community “trundled into a United Ireland”.
In January 1974, Faulkner was deposed as leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), and replaced by the anti-Sunningdale Harry West. Faulkner remained as chief executive of Northern Ireland, however, with the support of a majority in the assembly.
Unionist opponents of Sunningdale constituted the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) – an electoral pact uniting opponents of the agreement. At the February 1974 general election, UUUC candidates secured the vast majority of Northern Ireland’s available seats (11 out of 12). Seven UUP, three Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (VUPP), and one Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) MPs were elected.
Overall, the UUUC – running on the slogan, “Dublin is just a Sunningdale away” – won 58.3% of the vote.
Only one pro-Sunningdale MP, the SDLP’s Gerry Fitt, was returned in Belfast West.
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On 14 May, a motion condemning the cross-border Council of Ireland was defeated in the Sunningdale assembly by 44 votes to 28. A coalition of loyalist paramilitaries and workers, known as the Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC), responded by calling a general strike to begin the following day.
The strike brought Northern Ireland to a standstill. UWC barricades blocked roads, and intimidation was used to stop people from going to work. Most critically, electricity supplies were also disrupted with rotating four-hourly power cuts.
The British government, now led by Harold Wilson as prime minister, refused to negotiate with the UWC and declared a state of emergency.
In a famous broadcast on 25 May, Wilson condemned the UWC strike as seeking to “set up a sectarian and undemocratic state”. He referred to the strikers as “people who spend their lives sponging on Westminster and British democracy and then systematically assault democratic methods”.
He said: “The people on this side of the water – British parents – have seen their sons vilified and spat upon and murdered…
“Yet people who benefit from all this now viciously defy Westminster, purporting to act as though they were an elected government; people who spend their lives sponging on Westminster and British democracy and then systematically assault democratic methods. Who do these people think they are?”
The intervention, Wilson’s “Spongers” speech, has generally been regarded as ill-advised and poorly targeted. Many in the unionist community interpreted the speech as a slight on them. Some even took to wearing sponges in their lapels as a gesture of support for the UWC’s action.
Meanwhile, an attempt to use the British army to distribute petrol failed.
On 28 May, with Northern Ireland crippled by the UWC strike, Faulkner and his unionist colleagues resigned from the Sunningdale executive. Explaining his decision to step down, Faulkner said he was not prepared for the “catastrophe” which confronted the executive to continue.
He stated: “It is…apparent to us from the extent of support for the present stoppage, that the degree of consent needed to sustain the executive does not at present exist. Nor, as ulstermen, are we prepared to see our country undergo, for any political reason, the catastrophe which now confronts it?
“That is why I recommended this morning, on behalf of myself and my Unionist colleagues, that some sort of dialogue between government and those confronting it should now take place. But the secretary of state [for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees] was unable to accept this recommendation.
“We have therefore offered our resignations to the secretary of state, and have advised him to explore at once the possibility of constructing a new administration on a basis which will command general public confidence.”
The power-sharing body, having failed to win cross-community support, collapsed.
The SDLP also faced something of a backlash from within the nationalist community for the compromises it made. Critics derisively dubbed it “Stoop Down Lower, Please.”
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The assembly itself was prorogued on 30 May, but not officially abolished until 29 March 1975. Responsibility for the government of Northern Ireland thus reverted to the British parliament under the arrangements for direct rule.
Loyalist paramilitaries killed 39 civilians during the two-week strike. A total of 33 of those victims died in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings on 17 May 1974 – the deadliest day of the Troubles.
The unity of anti-Sunningdale action effectively killed the prospect of power-sharing for the best part of three decades. The Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention (1975) and a second Northern Ireland Assembly (1982-86) proved unsustainable solutions to the region’s political and security situation.
In 1998, a scheme bearing significant similarities to the Sunningdale framework, known as the Good Friday Agreement, led to the establishment of a power-sharing executive.