On 31 October 1973, the royal commission on the constitution, widely referred to as the ‘Kilbrandon commission’, published its final report, concluding a four-year inquiry into the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom.

The commission’s work constituted the first major study of the constitutional challenges posed by multi-national governance and rising national consciousness.

The report rejected both independence and federalism for the constituent nations of the UK, instead recommending legislative devolution for Scotland and Wales in the form of elected assemblies. The findings found expression in the 1978 Scotland and Wales Acts, and the failed referendum campaigns that followed.

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The commission was established by Harold Wilson’s Labour government in 1969, shortly after the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru secured groundbreaking parliamentary breakthroughs, both via by-elections.

Plaid won its first-ever parliamentary seat in July 1966 when its president, Gwynfor Evans, triumphed in the Carmarthen by-election. In 1967, the SNP’s Winnie Ewing won a similarly symbolic by-election victory in Hamilton.

The commission was in many senses a political device, allowing Wilson to both defer and outsource contentious decision-making on constitutional reform.

It was a response to external pressure, symbolised in the 1966 and 1967 by-election victories, as well as to internal division over constitutional reform. Implicit in the commission’s mandate was the need to devise responses to rising national sentiment that could secure wide support.

Its terms of reference required it to examine “the present functions of the legislature and government in relation to the several countries, nations and regions of the United Kingdom” and to consider “whether any changes are desirable in those functions or in existing constitutional and economic relationships.”

To this end, various constitutional schemes were considered, including devolution, federalism, confederalism and separatism.

Scotland and Wales were the focus of the commission’s remit. Devolution had been granted to Northern Ireland upon its creation in 1922 via the Government of Ireland Act 1920. During the course of the commission’s work, direct rule was imposed on Northern Ireland due to the deteriorating security situation at the outbreak of the Troubles.

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In 1973, when the commission submitted its findings, Edward Heath was prime minister of a Conservative government.

The majority report began with a frank acknowledgment of the reasons for its establishment.

It said: “In 1969, when we were appointed, there was obviously some discontent with the workings of government, and the outward signs of that discontent seemed to reflect especially the frustrations of those living furthest from London.”

The majority report recommended the establishment of 100-member assemblies in Scotland and Wales, elected for four-year fixed terms under the single transferable vote (STV) system. The number of Scottish and Welsh MPs at Westminster would be reduced from 71 to 51 and 36 to 31 respectively.

The extent of the powers that should be devolved, however, was subject to disagreement. Eight commissioners favoured an assembly for Scotland with limited legislative powers, while six favoured a similar scheme for Wales.

The report explicitly rejected independence for Scotland and Wales. But it found “ample evidence of the existence of [a] sense of nationhood” and identified “centralisation” as a source of political resentment.

The commission’s recommendation of devolution endorsed the maintenance of the existing unitary constitutional framework and the supremacy of the UK parliament. But the commission stressed the need to tailor arrangements to respond to different forms of national feeling in Scotland and Wales. The majority report therefore championed a form of asymmetric devolution.

The report also rejected the suggestion that the UK parliament should undergo wholesale reform to reflect a territorial element as “neither practicable nor desirable”. The commission insisted it would be “irrational to introduce a novel geographical factor into the House of Lords”.

The report was accompanied by a substantial Memorandum of Dissent from two commissioners, Lord Crowther-Hunt and professor Alan Peacock. They argued for different recommendations based on an alternative interpretation of the terms of reference. The minority report considered “what changes might be necessary in our system of government as a whole”.

It added: “Our colleagues have concentrated almost exclusively on the single question of devolution – though the word was not in fact used in our terms of reference; and they make no specific recommendation on any other issue.”

The 1973 majority report referred to difficulties in interpreting the commission’s broad terms of reference.

Crowther-Hunt and Professor Peacock observed that when respondents were shown a map of the English regions and offered five possible attitudes toward regional devolution, the percentage calling for greater autonomy varied little across the UK – and was, in some cases, stronger in England than in Wales. For example, 69% called for more devolution in the North West, while 57% called for more devolution in Wales.

The Memorandum of Dissent therefore proposed uniform administrative devolution to one assembly for Scotland, one for Wales, and five for English regions.

The majority and minority reports were debated briefly in the commons on 31 October 1973. The short debate, led by Heath as prime minister, scarcely reflected the complexity of the commission’s work or the efforts of its commissioners – two of whom, including the original chair Lord Crowther, had died since 1969.

Heath described the submission as a “substantial report which examines a number of complex and interrelated issues of major political, constitutional and practical importance.”

The commissioners, however, had “not found themselves able to make unanimous recommendations.”

He explained: “There is a minority report signed by two members; and the majority report, though it expresses agreement on the analysis of the underlying problems and of the nature of the possible solutions, does not arrive at unanimous recommendations.”

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That said, the Kilbrandon report effectively set the constitutional reform agenda for the remainder of the decade – and possibly beyond.

SNP candidate Margo MacDonald won the 1973 Glasgow Govan by-election with 6,360 votes (41.5%).

The February 1974 election saw a surge in support for the nationalist parties. The SNP’s representation rose from one seat to seven seats; its share of the vote doubled to 21.9%. Plaid Cymru won seats (two) for the first time at a general election.

Wilson returned to power leading a minority Labour government, dependent on the support of smaller parties. Changing circumstances, therefore, precipitated a second commons debate on the Kilbrandon report in March 1974.

Richard Wainwright, the Liberal MP for Colne Valley, said the results of the recent election had “probably rescued these documents from being just a series of text books”. He also referenced the deteriorating economic conditions and a “prospect of a drop in our gross national product”.

Wainwright added: “Many authorities expect that in itself to place a considerable strain on our constitution.”

He expressed his support for the minority report and the establishment of five regional assemblies in England that could “draw upon the deep-rooted loyalties that exist”.

David Steel, the future Liberal leader, noted his party’s support for a “federal structure in which the economic divisions of the Treasury also would be included within Scotland.”

He added: “That is quite different from the Scottish nationalist policy of a sovereign State. It is quite different from what Kilbrandon recommended, for I concede at once that Kilbrandon rejected both separatism and federalism.”

Nonetheless, Steel referred to the report as an opportunity to unite Scotland “behind what I regard as the minimum demand”.

Contributions from SNP and Plaid Cymru MPs referred to the report as a possible “first step” to full self-government.

In September 1974, Wilson’s government published a white paper entitled Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and Wales, putting forward proposals based on the Kilbrandon commission.

The October 1974 election returned Wilson’s government with a small majority, which withered over the course of the parliament. The SNP once again improved its standing, securing 11 MPs and 30% of the vote north of the border.

Plaid Cymru increased its representation by one to three.

James Callaghan, who succeeded Wilson as prime minister in 1976, responded with the Scotland Act 1978 and the Wales Act 1978 – both of which provided for the establishment of devolved assemblies, subject to post-legislative referenda.

On 13 December 1976, Callaghan introduced the Scotland and Wales Bill (before the legislation was split in two) at second reading. He told MPs that the “origins of the bill can be found in the royal commission on the constitution, which was set up seven years ago.”

Callaghan argued that devolution was a necessary response to the “movement of popular will”.

This legislation also coincided with a marked shift in parliamentary arithmetic. With the loss of its commons majority, Labour once again relied on smaller parties to prop up the government.

The bill/bills, however, did not accept Kilbrandon’s recommendation on reducing the number of Scottish and Welsh MPs at Westminster. The devolution schemes also differed on the electoral system; the proposed assemblies would be elected under the first-past-the-post system as opposed to STV.

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The Callaghan government effectively embraced devolution, but the Labour Party at large was divided.

In Wales, the anti-devolution position was subscribed to by prominent Labour figures, including future leader Neil Kinnock. They argued that a Welsh assembly would be an expensive, unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and a danger to the unity of the United Kingdom.

These MPs also capitalised on fears of distrust between various areas and social groups.

Leo Abse was a prominent figure in the “gang of six” of Welsh Labour MPs who opposed devolution. The Labour MP for Torfaen, Abse claimed that an assembly would lead to the dominance of the Welsh language in public life.

Speaking in a 1976 commons debate, he said: “There may be too few passengers on the new Swansea to Paddington Inter-City expresses, but there will be a packed gravy train steaming out of the Cardiff City Exchange, and most of Wales knows that no carriages will be fuller than the first-class coaches marked ‘For Welsh speakers only’.

In 1978, Kinnock claimed that children in Anglesey were being prevented from going to the toilet unless they asked in Welsh – which he referred to as “linguistic racialism”.

Debating Plaid Cymru’s Dafydd Elis-Thomas, Kinnock said he could “take the honourable gentleman to a school in Anglesey – I shall not mention the name of the village because it has only one school – in which children of five or six have to ask in Welsh to go to the lavatory or suffer the consequences.”

In Scotland, Tam Dalyell served as de facto leader of Labour’s anti-devolutionist tendency. He famously posed the “West Lothian question” (so-called after his constituency), which referred to the perceived imbalance between the voting rights in the House of Commons of MPs from Scottish and Welsh constituencies that would arise with devolution.

In other words, under devolution, MPs from Scotland and Wales could vote on issues affecting only England, while English MPs could not vote on matters devolved to Scotland or Wales.

Dalyell first articulated this famous constitutional dilemma on 14 November 1977, during a debate on the Scotland Bill.

He asked: “For how long will English constituencies and English honourable members tolerate… at least 119 honourable members from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland exercising an important, and probably often decisive, effect on English politics while they themselves have no say in the same matters in Scotland, Wales and Ireland?”

He said that the “West Lothian… problem pinpoints a basic design fault in the steering of the devolutionary coach which will cause it to crash into the side of the road before it has gone a hundred miles.”

The “West Lothian question”, a term coined by Conservative MP Enoch Powell, naturally arose from the asymmetric settlement recommended in the Kilbrandon report.

Powell told MPs that “you must resolve the Union into a [symmetric] federation unless you are to end up in inextricable contradictions and injustices in the House of Commons, which is the essence of our Parliamentary Union.”

A Labour MP, George Cunningham, inserted a critical amendment into the Scotland Bill during its committee stage. The so-called “40% clause” required at least 40% of the total registered electorate to vote ‘Yes’ in a referendum for the act to be implemented. The amendment, which was strongly opposed by the government, passed by 166 votes to 151.

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The 1979 referenda on the Scotland and Wales Acts amounted to debacles, albeit in disparate senses.

In Scotland, a narrow majority of 51.6% (1,230,937 votes) voted in favour of the proposed devolution scheme, with 48.4% (1,153,502) voting against. On a turnout of 63.8%, however, the ‘Yes’ vote represented only 32.9% of the electorate, failing to fulfil Cunningham’s wrecking clause.

Meanwhile, the referendum in Wales saw 79.7% of voters reject the proposals, with only 20.3% voting in favour. The turnout was 58.8%. Unlike in Scotland, the result was not subject to any ambiguity from the so-called ‘40% rule’.

The ‘No’ vote was absolute and devastating.

These defeats led to the collapse of Callaghan’s government and shelved, in the medium term, the devolution agenda.

In the following decades, however, the cause was sustained by the growing strength of Labour’s pro‑devolution tendency, the policies of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government, and the ability of nationalist parties to maintain – and improve – their parliamentary standing.

The anti-devolution element in Labour had effectively disappeared by the time of the 1997 pre-legislative referenda. Kinnock’s vehement opposition to devolution subsided during his tenure as Labour leader. By 1989, symbolised by the support for the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC), every Scottish Labour MP had come to support devolution (that is, except Dalyell).

On 11 September 1997, Scotland voted emphatically in favour of a devolved parliament with tax-varying powers. The 1997 referendum also asked two separate questions: one to gauge opinion on the principle of a parliament and another to tackle its tax-raising powers.

On the first question, 1,775,045 voters (74.3%) voted ‘Yes’. 614,400 (25.7%) voted ‘No’.

On the second question regarding tax-varying powers, 1,512,889 voters (63.5%) voted ‘Yes’. 870,263 (36.5%) voted ‘No’.

On 18 September 1997, voters in Wales narrowly approved the creation of a national assembly. The Welsh devolution referendum, a key pledge of Tony Blair’s new Labour government, produced a ‘Yes’ vote of 50.3% (559,419 votes) versus 49.7% (552,698 votes).