Opinion: Sarkozy and the EU

Europe's leadership cannot be left to France alone.

Nicolas Sarkozy – France's energetic and somewhat unpredictable president – had big plans for his stint as EU president in the second half of 2008. He was going to help stabilise the Middle East and Northern Africa, strengthen European defence policy, act on growing immigration fears, and forge an ambitious agreement on climate change – and generally show that France is still very much at the heart of enlarged European Union.

However, many of Sarkozy’s plans ran into opposition well before he took over on July 1st. And the Irish referendum on Lisbon treaty on June 12th has fundamentally changed Sarkozy’s to-do list. Whether he wants to or not, he will now have to focus on resolving the legal and institutional mess created by the Irish No.

In that, he will have to strike a delicate balance between trying to save the treaty and restoring the EU's legitimacy. The EU has spent seven years negotiating the Lisbon treaty, and its failed predecessor, the constitutional treaty. Nineteen countries (including the UK) have already ratified it, so the EU will be loath to abandon the process. Since most Irish do not seem to have a problem with the text as such, the preferred option of most EU governments is for the Irish to hold another referendum in 2009 – after having been given reassurances on sovereignty, neutrality and taxation. However, the EU cannot push Ireland too hard to reconsider, lest it be accused of disregarding the say of Irish voters.

To get agreement on a way out by December, Sarkozy would have to excel in quiet diplomacy – which is not one of his strong sides if past performance is anything to go by. Instead of building European coalitions ahead of his presidency, Sarkozy has already annoyed many important allies. Paris’ relations with Germany – traditionally France’s closest ally in the EU – remain fragile. Sarkozy fell out with Chancellor Angela Merkel over his plans for a Mediterranean Union that would have excluded non-Mediterranean member-states while drawing on EU funds (a large chunk of which come from Germany). Berlin has managed to water down the proposals considerably. But Merkel and her government remain suspicious of Sarkozy’s activism and his apparent reluctance to consult with EU partners before launching initiatives.

Economics is another area of contention. Sarkozy is convinced that one reason why the EU is unpopular is that voters see it as a ‘Trojan horse’ for the destabilising forces of globalization. Instead, he keeps calling for a more “protective Europe”. The implications – less openness to trade, national champions in key industries, more state subsidies for farmers – are making many people in the UK, Scandinavia and Eastern Europe rather nervous. As if to reinforce their worries, Sarkozy started his presidency by criticising the European Central Bank for raising interest rates (anathema to stability-conscious Germans) and blaming the Irish No on the EU’s “overly liberal” trade policy run by the British trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson.

In short, Sarkozy's presidency will be as important as it will be tricky. This could be Gordon Brown's European moment. Since taking over as prime minister, his approach to Europe has been cautious, almost hostile at times. Now he needs to show constructive engagement. Most of the items of Sarkozy's presidency agenda matter hugely for Britain, and for Europe as a whole.

First, the EU needs to figure out by December how to achieve its headline target of cutting CO2 emissions by 20 per cent by 2020. If it does not, it cannot assume leadership at next year’s global climate change conference in Copenhagen. If the EU does not assume leadership, no-one else will and the chances of the US, China and the rest of the world agreeing on a post-Koyto regime to save the climate will fall precipitously.

Second, after 40 years of French exceptionalism, Sarkozy has pledged to fully reintegrate France into Nato's military command – a laudable move. But he wants a strengthening of EU defence policy in return, something that the UK has traditionally opposed. Brown is key to a grand bargain here.

Thirdly, Sarkozy is proposing a 'European immigration pact' that could potentially get the UK more EU help in dealing with illegal immigrants and asylum seekers while attracting more skilled professionals to Europe as a whole. Add things such as a looming economic recession, the threat of a nuclear Iran or the crisis in Zimbabwe and it quickly becomes clear that one European politician – even a hyper-active one – cannot and should not be left to sort out the EU’s business.

Gordon Brown gets on well with both Merkel and Sarkozy, and Britain still has many friends in the new member-states. So Brown would be in good position to help with France's ambitious agenda and to counter whatever protectionist or inward-looking tendencies may emerge from Paris.

Katinka Barysch

Katinka Barysch is the deputy director of the Centre for European Reform. She is an advisor to the EU select committee of the House of Lords, the World Economic Forum and other organisations.

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